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Abstract 
Innovation activities create substantial firm value, but they are difficult to manage owing to agency 
risk which is commonly thought to result in shirking, hence underinvestment in innovation. 
However, agency risk can also create inefficient allocation of resources among innovation 
activities, on which the literature provided limited understanding. We examine an important 
outcome created by agency risk—that agents pursue the quantity of innovation at the expense of 
the novelty, and investigate how it is influenced by corporate and public governance. We theorize 
that improved corporate governance tools, including better alignment of agents’ private incentives 
and stronger monitoring, and high-quality public governance reduce such agency risk in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, higher-quality public governance enhances the 
functioning of corporate governance tools in further reducing such agency risk in innovation. We 
test our theory in the context of Chinese SOEs that responded to state’s pro-innovation policies 
relying disproportionately on quantifiable outcomes (e.g., patent counts) for assessing innovation 
performance. Our difference-in-differences estimates provide overall support for the hypotheses. 
These findings provide new insights on how agency risk affects innovation by distinguishing the 
consequences on quantity and novelty of innovation and on how conventional corporate 
governance tools shaping innovation is dependent on public governance. 
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Despite their tremendous value to firms, innovation activities are difficult to manage because 
they entail considerable uncertainties and information asymmetry (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 
1991; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). These conditions create a fertile ground for agency risk (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Extant studies leveraged agency theory to examine how corporate governance tools, such 
as incentive alignment and monitoring, reduce shirking among agents (Cohen & Levin, 1989; 
Zenger, 1994), thereby alleviating underinvestment problems in innovation activities (e.g., 
Kochhar & David, 1996; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; David, O’Brien, & 
Yoshikawa, 2008). However, increased inputs invested in innovation activities alone do not 
necessarily generate greater firm value. He and Wang (2009) and Zhou, Gao, and Zhao (2017) 
argued that agency risk also reduces the efficiency of deploying invested resources in innovation 
activities. Despite this important observation, extant research has provided limited understanding 
of how such inefficiency could occur. 
We draw on the multitasking model to examine a specific type of agency risk that can create 
such inefficiency. We focus on the moral hazard that certain agents pursue the quantity of 
innovation which is more-readily captured by objective metrics used to evaluate these agents, at 
the expense of the novelty of innovation which is less-well captured by these evaluation metrics. 
This is a meaningful topic to explore because novel innovation contributes to a firm’s innovative 
capability, competitive advantages and long-term survival, such that overlooking novel innovation 
diverges from optimal firm value (Katila 2000, Mitchell 1989).  
We examine how corporate and political governance tools reduce this type of moral hazard 
that threatens to upset the balance between the quantity and the quality of innovation. We first 
examine how conventional corporate governance tools including aligning agents’ incentives with 
firm value and monitoring reduce this moral hazard, thereby shaping the balance between the 
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quantity and the novelty of innovation. We further examine how the broader institutional context—
the quality of public governance (also known as the quality of government, see Weber, 1968) in 
the political system affects the accountability of principals of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
thereby influencing the moral hazard and firms’ innovation outcomes. We finally examine a 
mutually reinforcing effect between corporate and political governance. 
To test our theory, we examine publicly listed Chinese SOEs between 2000 and 2012, which 
constitutes a suitable research context for the following reasons. First, this context offers an 
opportunity to observe the conditions that prompt agents to pursue the quantity in innovation at 
the expense of the novelty. In 2006, the Chinese government initiated a major policy change to 
reward domestic firms for indigenous innovation. The state designed detailed and actionable plans 
to produce a certain number of domestic patents. However, the policy specified very limited 
actionable checks on the quality or novelty of those patents. The policy was applicable to all firms, 
but it had particularly strong implications for SOEs. The state also acted as the principal of SOEs. 
Thus, by implementing this policy, the state directly established evaluation metrics to be used for 
assessing the innovation activities of SOE agents. (By contrast, the principals of privately owned 
enterprises may or may not adopt the same metrics to incentivize their agents, depending on how 
much they decide to respond to the call of the state.) These metrics enabled agents to make certain 
tradeoffs between the quantity and the novelty in developing innovation. Second, certain SOEs 
face greater agency risk than others because of the substantial variation in the corporate 
governance, including the degree of incentive alignment and monitoring (Xu, 2011). Finally, 
extensive disparity exists in the quality of public governance across different regions in China (Xu, 
Tihanyi, & Hitt, 2017; Jia, 2014). Therefore, studying the response of Chinese SOEs to the state’s 
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innovation policy allows us to separately and jointly examine our theory about the effects of 
corporate and public governance on firms’ innovation outcomes. 
This study offers the following key contributions. First, we introduce a different, important, 
and yet understudied type of agency risk to the innovation management literature compared with 
the common concerns over agents’ underinvestment in innovation (Cohen & Levin, 1989; Zenger 
1994; Kochhar & David, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 2002). This new theoretical angle allows us to 
diverge from the unidimensional outcome of “more or less” innovation to examine the quantity of 
innovation and the proportion of novel innovation. The innovation literature has examined the 
novelty of technologies, but the conventional perspective was that novelty was a matter of firm 
choice, that is, either firms intentionally chose to develop less-novel incremental technologies or 
certain firms developed more-novel technologies (such as to disrupt other firms, e.g., Mitchell, 
1989, Henderson & Clark, 1990). We demonstrate that this outcome may not always have been 
created intentionally, but it can be generated by agency risk and improper use of governance tools.  
Second, we contribute to the corporate governance literature the theoretical view that aside 
from the corporate governance of agents (the predominant focus in prior studies), the 
accountability of the principal can also effectively shape the innovation outcomes of firm. Extant 
research finds that the broader social-economic context can affect corporate governance (Greve & 
Zhang, 2017), including the degree to which principals hold agents accountable. Specifically, 
national traditions in terms of prevailing ownership types, national value, and governance logics 
influence the extent of managerial discretion of firms in the nation (e.g., Crossland & Hambrick, 
2007; Crossland & Chen, 2013; Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas-Lamy, & Crespi, 2016). We 
examine how a core feature of the political system, namely, the quality of public governance, also 
shapes the functioning of the state principals of SOEs. Moreover, we found that good corporate 
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governance generates a more notable effect on firm innovation outcomes in the presence of higher-
quality public governance. Therefore, the effect of corporate governance on innovation is 
influenced by the institutional context, which further supports the call for gaining more 
understanding into the institutional contexts of agency theory (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015). 
Third, this study also addresses a key tension in the research of state capitalism, namely, a 
state’s involvement in commercial enterprises (e.g., Zhou et al., 2017). Some research argued that 
the state’s long-term orientation would foster innovation in SOEs (e.g., Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 
2010; Choi, Lee, & Williams, 2011), whereas others questioned the state’s capability to manage 
innovation (e.g., Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 1998). We demonstrate that while the 
active intention of the state to promote innovation can indeed increase the overall amount of 
innovation, it remains a tricky task for the state to ensure the balance pertaining to the quantity and 
the novelty of innovation. 
Finally, this study sheds new light on the important context of innovation in China. Despite 
increasing scholarly and public policy interest in the process and outcome of innovation in China 
(e.g., Abrami, Kirby, & McFarlan, 2014; Huang, 2010; Huang, Geng, & Wang, 2017), there exists 
much speculation about the quality and the quantity of innovations developed there based on 
anecdotes. This study is among the first to examine the balance between the quantity and the 
novelty of innovation in Chinese SOEs, particularly through the lens of agency risk. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretical Background: Agency Risk in Innovation 
Many agents in firms play critical roles in developing technological innovation. These agents 
include not only the technical personnel who directly participate in innovation activities such as 
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scientist and engineers (Huang, 2017; Huang & Ertug, 2014), but also those who make strategic 
decisions to substantially shape innovation outcomes, such as the board of directors and firm 
managers (Damanpour, 1991; He & Wang, 2009). In this paper, we focus on firm managers and 
board of directors because they make strategic decisions that influence the processes in which 
innovation is pursued or terminated, the resources allocated among R&D activities, and the internal 
evaluation metrics used to evaluate and reward innovation outcomes (Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 
1973). To enable these agents to further the firm’s interests and create value by generating 
innovation, they must have sufficient capabilities and right incentives (Lee & O’Neill, 2003).  
Providing the right incentives to firm agents to engage in innovation is challenging for two 
reasons. First, innovation requires highly uncertain and complex tasks, such that the outcomes are 
confounded both by agents’ own efforts and by factors that are beyond the control of agents and 
firms (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Second, innovation generates greater information asymmetry 
because it confers greater private information and generates proprietary information that managers 
are unwilling to communicate with mass investors (Bebchuk & Stole, 1993). Directly observing 
agents’ efforts in the case of developing innovation or accomplishing tasks that help build 
innovative capabilities is difficult and often impossible; hence, a common approach for providing 
proper incentives is for principals to use alternative metrics to evaluate performance outcomes of 
agents (Gibbons, 2005).  
In innovation, certain metrics for assessing how well agents promoted firms’ innovation are 
more objective and less noisy. The most common metrics include quantifying observable 
innovation outcomes (e.g., counting patents). By contrast, other measures tend to be more 
subjective and noisier, such as measures of the quality or novelty of innovation. Innovation 
exhibits large variance in their level of novelty; thus, the economic value of innovation is highly 
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heterogeneous (Cohen & Levin, 1989). Novel innovation often helps build and enhance a firm’s 
innovative capability by enhancing the firm’s performance and competitive advantage (Katila, 
2000; Mitchell, 1989). Indeed, in many technology industries, certain incumbents generate 
incremental improvements and follow their core technologies to obsolescence and obscurity, 
whereas firms that can generate novel and breakthrough innovation can become new industry 
leaders (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Therefore, novel innovation has greater 
potential to achieve higher long-term value for firms than incremental innovation, it is also more 
costly and riskier to develop. Despite the value of novel innovation, the evaluation of the novelty 
of innovation inevitably entails a larger subjective component and contains greater noise. 
Principals, particularly less informed principals, often rely heavily on objective, quantifiable, 
and less-noisy metrics of quantifying innovation outcomes than more subjective and noisier 
metrics of assessing the novelty of innovation, wherein the latter elicits two major concerns. The 
first concern is that principals, who commonly do not directly participate in the process of 
developing innovation, possibly lack the capabilities and information to accurately assess the 
novelty of innovation (e.g., Kor & Mahoney, 2005; He & Wang, 2009), which will increase noise 
in the measurement (Feltham & Xie, 1994). This noise will feed into the noise in the correlation 
between the compensation paid to agents and their actual efforts; thus, agents are less likely to 
exert efforts ex ante (Gibbons, 2005). The second concern arises from an adverse outcome that 
would be created when agents are concerned about an inherent infringement hazard due to a lack 
of credible commitment in subjective evaluation. Specifically, principals who use subjective 
evaluation metrics will have incentives to give agents low evaluation and thus underpay them after 
agents invest efforts in developing innovation, in anticipation of which agents will underinvest ex 
ante (e.g., Gibbons, 1987; 2005).  
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This metric adoption, however, engenders a common type of moral hazard expressed as “you 
get what you pay for” (Kerr, 1975); this concept is theorized by the multitasking model 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) as follows: Agents exert greater efforts in activities where 
outcomes are captured by a certain type of evaluation metrics than in other activities whose 
outcomes are not captured by the focal metrics. Meanwhile, agents disregard the possibility that 
over-pursuing activities captured by the focal metrics may harm long-term firm value, and they 
ignore the prospect that activities that are not captured by the focal metrics (which thus receive 
insufficient investment from them) would have contributed to firm value (Baker, 1992; Lambert, 
Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Gibbons, 1998; for a review, see, e.g., Predergast, 1999; Gibbons, 
2005).  
Therefore, when principals adopt the more-objective and less-noisy metrics of quantifying 
innovation, the multitasking model predicts that agents whose private interests are not aligned with 
firm value will prioritize the generation of a larger quantity of innovation, but they will not 
prioritize the production of novel innovation captured by more subjective and noisier metrics—
even though such innovation would have increased firm value. The greater the extent to which 
agents overinvest in incremental innovation and underinvest in novel innovation, the further they 
diverge from the optimal firm value because a more balanced mix of incremental and novel 
innovation helps build greater firm innovation capabilities and create higher firm value, according 
to the theory on balancing exploration and exploitation in firm innovation (e.g., Katila and Ahuja, 
2002). How much agents care about this divergence from optimal value is shaped by corporate 
and public governance, which will be discussed next. 
Effects of Corporate Governance on Firm Innovation 
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Two key corporate governance practices determine managerial agency risk in modern firms: 
(1) the use of governance tools to align the private incentives of agents more closely with firm 
value and (2) the use of monitoring by owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; He & Wang, 2009; 
Desender et al., 2016; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). We study each one in turn.  
When agents are given greater private incentives in accordance with firm value, they should 
have a greater personal stake in preserving or enhancing firm value. When the principal starts to 
evaluate the performance of innovation primarily by quantifying innovation outcomes, a closer 
alignment of the agents’ private interest and the firm value will augment the behavior of agents 
compared with the predictions made based on the multitasking model by changing the agent’s 
consideration of the costs of developing innovation.  
The costs of simply producing any innovation are not the same for all agents. They tend to be 
higher for agents whose interests are more aligned with firm value than for agents whose interests 
are less aligned with firm value. These costs mainly take the form of the opportunity costs of 
foregoing other value-enhancing activities to (over)produce innovation. Some fungible resources 
(e.g., financial resources) devoted to such activities may otherwise be invested in other 
undertakings that could offer greater contribution to firm value; thus, compared with alternative 
uses of these resources, certain innovation generates less value for firms (Cockburn, 2004). 
Therefore, agents whose private interests are more closely aligned with firm value will exercise 
more checks and greater scrutiny on the opportunity costs of producing innovation than agents 
whose interests are less aligned with firm value. 
Consequently, when the principal evaluates agents based on quantifying innovation outcomes, 
the agents whose interests are completely aligned with firm value will avoid promoting innovation 
at any cost. However, agents who do not share the interest of achieving higher firm value will 
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decide otherwise because they are simply rewarded by the principal for producing additional 
innovation, but they do not bear the associated opportunity costs. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H1a: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, firms whose 
agents’ private interests are more aligned with firm value will generate a smaller quantity of 
innovation than firms where this alignment is weak.  
 
Second, fungible resources can be used to develop different innovation projects. Highly novel 
technologies are costly to develop because novel innovation frequently take longer to create, are 
riskier to develop, and have higher failure rates than general technologies (Fleming, 2001, 2007). 
However, metrics that simply quantify innovation outcomes without assessing novelty will not 
reward a more novel innovation differently from a less novel one. In particular, the private benefits 
of agents whose interests (e.g., personal, financial, and career) are less aligned with firm value for 
developing novel innovation arise more from the principal’s rewards and less from changes in firm 
value. Thus, these agents do not derive significant private benefits from developing more-novel 
innovation than from developing less-novel innovation because the principal’s reward metrics 
make minimal distinction between incremental and novel innovation. Therefore, these agents have 
little reason to produce costlier and riskier novel innovation and they are likely to develop less-
costly incremental innovation. This incentive will directly affect the proportion of novel innovation 
among all new innovation produced by the focal firm. That is, in response to the principals’ 
evaluation metrics of quantifying innovation outcomes without assessing the novelty of 
innovation, agents whose interests diverge from firm value will produce a smaller proportion of 
novel innovation.1 Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis:  
                                                          
1 Some research argued that giving agents higher financial incentives could lead to greater risk aversion (e.g. Beatty 
& Zajac, 1994; Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007). Because certain novel innovation is risky to 
develop, this argument would suggest an outcome that counteract H1b. We acknowledge this theoretical possibility. 
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H1b: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, firms whose 
agents’ private interests are more aligned with firm value will generate a larger proportion of 
novel innovation relative to all the innovation produced by the focal firm than firms where this 
alignment is weaker. 
 
The second determinant of agency risk is the degree of monitoring performed by the principal. 
When principals more effectively monitor the actions of agents, the latter tend to exert greater 
effort that approaches the optimal level for firm value (e.g., Hart & Holmstrom, 1986); thus, the 
misaligned incentives and associated moral hazard discussed above are less likely to occur 
(Gibbons, 2005). The ultimate goals of principals in promoting innovation commonly entail 
enhancing firm innovativeness. Through closer monitoring and supervision, a principal is more 
likely to detect and correct the agents’ actions of gaming the metrics that cannot be justified from 
a firm value perspective, such as that of accelerating the production of less-novel innovation at the 
expense of novelty and possibly at the cost of other value-enhancing activities. Therefore, we offer 
the following theoretical predictions.  
H2a: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, firms with 
stronger monitoring of their agents will generate a smaller quantity of innovation than firms 
with weaker monitoring. 
 
H2b: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, firms with 
stronger monitoring of their agents will generate a larger proportion of novel innovation 
relative to all the innovation produced by the focal firm than firms with weaker monitoring. 
Effects of Public Governance on Firm Innovation  
A distinctive feature of SOEs is that their principals, namely, governments, do not always act 
in the best interest of the public whom they are supposed to represent (Zhou et al., 2017). How 
well a government performs its functions, including the function of acting as principals of SOEs 
                                                          
To the extent that the empirical results lend strong support for H1b, we consider the core arguments above to be more 
predominant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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to advance the value of state assets in those firms, are determined by the quality of government 
(North, 1981; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). 
What constitutes a high-quality government? A fundamental theory that profoundly 
influenced the understanding of governments in multiple disciplines, including political science, 
sociology, and economics, was developed by Weber (1968). In the Weberian tradition, high-
quality governments are more strongly characterized by a modern legal rational public governance 
system than a pre-modern patrimonial governance system. A legal rational governance system is 
bounded by impersonal rules, relies on hierarchy and meritocracy, stays politically neutral, and 
compensates civil servants based on salary. In a legal rational governance system, government 
officials do not have the right to extract rents from private citizens. By contrast, a patrimonial 
governance system relies heavily on loyalty in governance and gives licenses to officials to extract 
“prebends” from the citizens as legitimate compensation for their service. 
Scholars across multiple disciplines have reached wide consensus that under high-quality 
public governance along the Weberian principles, public officials diligently perform the functions 
of government and are highly restrained from extracting from the general public, which fosters 
economic development (e.g., Polanyi, [1944] 1957; Evans, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Evans 
& Rauch, 1999; Rauch & Evans, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1990; Wade, 
1990). 
Therefore, under high-quality public governance, public officials of relevant government 
branches more diligently perform the role of the state as principals of SOEs, which is to promote 
the value of SOEs. Faced with insufficient information on the agents’ actions (such as those related 
to innovation), a key task that a principal can undertake is to collect additional information, which, 
despite the imperfection and incompleteness, will improve the welfare of the principal 
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(Holmstrom, 1979; for a review, see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). For example, the principal can 
create new systems of information collection and make better use of available information about 
agents’ actions and external factors that affect firm outcomes (Holmstrom, 1979). This additional 
information will help the principal design governance tools that effectively align the agents’ 
incentives with firm value and/or reduce the agency risk.  
Conversely, under low-quality public governance, government officials are generally held 
less accountable for advancing the state’s interests. Thus, public officials responsible for 
exercising the role of SOE principals can shirk their responsibilities, such as by ignoring actions 
needed to enhance the SOEs’ value, including information collection. Consequently, SOE agents 
have increased opportunities to get away with actions that game the metrics and that fail to advance 
or even harm the value of SOEs. Therefore, agency risk in SOEs is lower in the presence of high-
quality governments and agents of these SOEs are less likely to engage in moral hazard in 
innovation. We then propose the following hypotheses.   
H3a: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, SOEs 
governed by a higher-quality government will generate a smaller quantity of innovation than 
SOEs governed by a lower-quality government. 
 
H3b: When principals adopt metrics that rely on quantifying innovation outcomes, SOEs 
governed by a higher-quality government will generate a larger proportion of novel innovation 
relative to all the innovation produced by the focal firm than SOEs governed by a lower-quality 
government. 
Interdependent Effects of Corporate and Public Governance on Firm Innovation 
The mechanisms of corporate governance for agents and those of public governance for 
principals (identified here as state principals) do not work independently from each other in 
affecting the innovation outcomes of SOEs. A less informed state principal (i.e., one that collects 
less information on agents’ actions) is less capable of distinguishing the degree to which agents’ 
actions have contributed to certain firm outcomes, as opposed to external factors that are outside 
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the agents’ control (e.g., luck). Although it is commonly known that innovation activities are 
inherently uncertain and risky because of factors beyond the agents’ control, precisely estimating 
the degree of such uncertainty and risk is extremely difficult for uninformed parties. Thus, a less-
informed principal is more likely to fail to sufficiently reward agents for their productive actions 
and/or punish agents disproportionately for innovation outcomes that are primarily influenced by 
factors outside the agent’s control.  
However, this inefficiency does not affect all agents equally. While it might be ambiguous as 
to whether mistakes made by less-informed principals would benefit or harm the agents whose 
interests and actions have diverged from the firm value, it is in the best interest of agents who more 
diligently work to contribute to firm value to have a more informed principal to better identify and, 
thus, reward their efforts rather than, for example, a principal using the population average, which 
also includes less-diligent agents to make generic inferences about the efforts of more-diligent 
agents. As shown by Holmstrom (1979), the welfare of both principals and agents can be improved 
when principals collect additional information on agents.  
Therefore, when high-quality public governance prompts the state principal to more diligently 
collect information on SOE agents’ actions, agents who more diligently work toward firm value 
(owing to higher-quality corporate governance) are likely to support information collection efforts, 
such as by interacting more intensely with the state principal to facilitate the information collection 
process. This outcome suggests that under high-quality public governance, corporate governance 
further reduces the perverse innovation outcomes that would have been produced by the moral 
hazard of agents. Stated alternatively, the relationships between corporate governance tools and 
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SOE innovation outcomes (as theorized in H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b) will be more pronounced in 
the presence of higher quality public governance. Thus, we develop the following hypotheses. 2 
H4a: The effect predicted by H1a is stronger for SOEs governed by a higher-quality 
government than for SOEs governed by a lower-quality government. 
  
H4b: The effect predicted by H1b is stronger for SOEs governed by a higher-quality 
government than for SOEs governed by a lower-quality government. 
 
H4c: The effect predicted by H2a is stronger for SOEs governed by a higher-quality 
government than for SOEs governed by a lower-quality government. 
 
H4d: The effect predicted by H2b is stronger for SOEs governed by a higher-quality 
government than for SOEs governed by a lower-quality government. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical framework described above. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
To examine our hypotheses, we utilize an exogenous top-down innovation policy that can 
serve as a quasi-experiment in the context of China. China follows a state capitalism model 
wherein the state plays a direct role in promoting and influencing economic development through 
reform policies (e.g., Zhang & Greve, 2016) and uses SOEs as an important channel to influence 
the economy and society (e.g., Xu, 2011). In recent years, the state has actively promoted 
                                                          
2  We acknowledge that public and corporate governance can act as substitutes—but under very different 
circumstances. For example, if a particular public governance mechanism allows or forces the state principal more 
directly to make decisions for the SOEs on specific activities (such as allocating resources and personnel to different 
innovation projects and starting/terminating various projects) and overrule the decisions made by agents on those 
issues, then this public governance mechanism will weaken the agents’ discretion with respect to such activities, 
thereby making agents’ actions less relevant to innovation outcomes. When this happens, corporate governance 
mechanisms that aim to influence agents’ behavior will also become less relevant to (i.e., exert less effect on) 
innovation outcomes. This hypothetical scenario will constitute a substitution effect. However, such scenario is less 
likely to hold in our research context, particularly with respect to SOEs. Politicians responsible for managing state 
assets in SOEs commonly lack the technical knowledge that would enable them to make specific decisions regarding 
operational issues in innovation development (Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998). Particularly in our empirical context 
(which we introduce next), the Chinese government continued to rely on SOE agents to make key decisions on firms’ 
innovation activities. The state lacked the ability to assess the substantive content (and thus the quality) of the patents 
other than counting the numbers of the produced patents. 
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innovation to enhance the innovativeness and, thus, the long-term value of firms and the country. 
Patents resulting from indigenous innovation in China have increased because of economic 
development (Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Huang, 2010). Moreover, it was only in 2006 that the state 
started to fully pursue this policy goal through major political campaigns originating from the 
central level and systematically build an incentive system to promote domestic innovation. Among 
the most important overarching policy guidelines for promoting indigenous innovation in China 
are the “China’s National Medium- to Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology (2006-2020)” by the State Council of China in 2006 and the follow-up “National 
Intellectual Property Strategy (2008),” which called for the enhancement of overall innovation 
capability and for the transformation of China into an innovative society by 2020 (Abrami et al., 
2014). These policies were included in the 12th Five-Year Plan,3 which stipulated that China 
would pursue an ambitious program of technological development that would enable the country 
to enter the ranks of innovative countries by 2020 and become a global scientific power by mid-
century.4 These policies also explicitly encourage indigenous inventions and patents filed with the 
State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), China’s equivalent agency to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO). To implement these overarching general policy guidelines, 
subsequent policies specified several channels to reach these goals, including the pro-indigenous 
innovation government procurement policy that we utilize below in our empirical analysis. 
These policy guidelines and subsequent public policies reward the following innovation 
outcomes. First, the state designed comprehensive and actionable plans for faster accumulation of 
                                                          
3 The Five-Year Plans, which set goals and paths for the country’s development every five years, are the most 
important social and economic initiatives developed by the Communist Party of China. 
4 “China’s National Medium- to Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020),” 
issued by the State Council of China (2006). A Chinese version of this document is available at 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm (a summary in English is available at 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/pressroom/200507/t20050706_22978.htm). 
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patents. The aforementioned policy directives included specific clauses that mandated the overall 
national patenting targets, that is, achieving a set number of patents within a given length of time. 
For example, the state decreed that local firms must apply for two million patents by 2015.5 The 
overall targets were then allocated to local governments, and many local governments accordingly 
adopted policies to provide direct monetary incentives to apply for patents. 6  For instance, 
Zhangjiagang City in Jiangsu Province increased its patent subsidy in June 2006 for an invention 
patent application from RMB 1,500 to RMB 3,000 and added a reward of RMB 10,000 if the 
application was eventually granted (e.g., Lei, Sun, & Wright, 2013). As documented in many 
media reports, the quantity of patent production became a dominant metric in the incentive system 
created by the Chinese state to promote indigenous innovation.7 
In addition to the quantity outcome, the novelty of patents constitutes another important 
dimension. However, despite the importance of patent novelty to policymakers, minimal checks 
on the quality or novelty of patents have been implemented in pro-innovation public policies in 
China, and policy documents have failed to produce specific and actionable plans for quality 
checks, which is a stark contrast to the various metrics implemented to assess the quantities of 
patents (e.g., Liang, 2012).  
                                                          
5 “Patent fiction.” The Economist, December 13, 2014. 
6 This governance approach of cascading quantitative targets to lower level governments has a long history and 
continues to prevail in the Chinese political system. The central government designates a quantified target for each 
province (e.g., a required minimum “floor” or a required maximum “ceiling”—depending on the issue in question—
for certain metrics). Then, each provincial government decomposes its target for each next-level government in the 
province, which similarly cascades its share of the target to lower level governments. For example, Oi (1989: 58) 
documents that the state’s procurement of grain in the 1950s followed such a cascading procedure, in which “the 
provincial party secretary divided the provincial target among the different prefectures.” In another example, the 
central government attempted to achieve workplace safety goals by stipulating ceilings regarding annual workplace 
accident deaths to provincial governments, which then divided the number of allowed deaths among local governments 
(Fisman & Wang, 2017). 
7 For example, see “Chinese firms are filing lots of patents. How many represent good ideas?” The Economist, October 
14, 2010, and “Patent fiction.” The Economist, December 13, 2014. 
18 
 
 
In summary, the Chinese state adopted evaluation metrics characterized by heavy reliance on 
directly measurable outcomes of the quantity of patents and minimum specifications regarding the 
evaluation of patent novelty. This approach dominated the formulation and implementation of 
many follow-up policies. Therefore, the state’s implementation of the pro-innovation policy 
constitutes an example of a principal (of SOEs) that adopts metrics that more heavily rely on 
quantifiable outcomes to evaluate the innovation performance of agents. Thus, the post-policy 
periods (2007 and afterwards) constitute a good indicator of the adoption of these metrics. 
Finally, considerable regional variation in government quality exists in this context. At the 
root of governmental quality is the quality of external institutions that discipline governmental 
behavior. China generally lacks the institution of partisan competition in democracy to enhance 
governmental quality along the Weberian principles (e.g., Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). 
However, substantial regional disparity remains in the extent to which local government officials 
are held accountable to the public interest and are constrained from straying off to pursue their 
private interests (e.g., Cai, Fang, & Xu, 2011; Cull & Xu, 2005; Xu, 2011). This variation occurs 
because China essentially adopted a model of regional decentralization in its reforms (Xu, 2011). 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
We collect data on all publicly listed firms from WIND, a comprehensive database that 
compiles all public information disclosed by listed firms in China. From the SIPO, we obtain 
invention patents filed by all listed firms in China from 2000 to 2012 and eventually granted by 
the SIPO.8 Consistent with prior practice (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008; Huang & Murray, 2009; 
                                                          
8 The SIPO grants three types of patents: invention, utility model, and design patents. Compared with the other two 
categories, invention patents are the most substantive and rigorously examined patent, as they face the highest scrutiny 
and the strictest screening for quality and novelty in the approval process. The utility model and design patents 
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Huang, 2017), we regard the year of application as the time when a patent was produced. We focus 
on SOEs in the main analysis and offer a discussion of privately owned enterprises in the “Future 
Research” section. 
We leverage the innovation procurement policy, which is a top-down policy that was 
formulated under the overarching policy guidelines discussed above, as the exogenous event in the 
natural experiment. This policy mandated that governments purchase given categories of products 
only from the firms that were deemed to have been active in developing Chinese indigenous 
innovation. The list of industrial categories of products included in the catalog is reported in 
Appendix A. In practice, the central government provides a general catalog of products to which 
the procurement policy applies, and each provincial government made minor variations to the 
catalog to suit its particular circumstances. A comparison of the product catalogs published by 
multiple provincial governments suggests that the specific product categories are highly similar 
across provinces. Note that the goal of this policy was not to secure the suppliers of government 
contracts, but to increase the financial incentives of firms to produce innovation in designated 
fields or industrial categories by at least temporarily increasing governmental demand for their 
products. The details and product categories were unknown to the public until the policy was 
announced in 2006. Hence, we take the year after the announcement of the innovation procurement 
policy, that is, 2007, as the beginning of the period in which the policy effect began. Our data 
begin in 2000 and end in 2012, a reasonably long time window that helps us maintain a relative 
balance of years before and after the policy.  
                                                          
generally cover more incremental inventions (with no substantive examination required) and product designs, 
respectively (e.g., Hu & Jefferson, 2009). Given the difference in the nature of patents, the examination procedure, 
and the amount of protection, we focus on invention patents for consistency, which follows the approach adopted in 
prior studies (e.g., Wang, Li, & Furman, 2017). Invention patents granted by the SIPO also correspond better to the 
invention patents granted by the USPTO (known as utility patents in the U.S.) used in prior studies. In doing so, we 
restrict our attention to more-novel patents in the entire pool of domestic patents. We offer further discussion of the 
implications of this approach in the Results section. 
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Finally, we obtain province-year-level information from the China Statistical Yearbooks and 
the index of marketization of Chinese provinces developed by the National Economic Research 
Institute of China (NERI) (published as Fan, Wang, & Zhu, 2011). The NERI indices were 
validated and used in prior studies (e.g., Li & Qian, 2013; Wang & Qian, 2011; Jia, 2014; Jia & 
Mayer, 2017; Huang et al., 2017). 
Variables 
Dependent variables. We focus on two dependent variables: number of patents, defined as the 
total number of patents generated by firms in a given year, and proportion of novel patents, defined 
as the proportion of novel patents among all the patents produced by the focal firm in the given 
year. We follow the method developed by Fleming, Mingo, and Chen (2007) and regard a patent 
as novel if it involves the first occurrence of a new combination of patent classes compared with 
all the patents that have ever been granted by the SIPO until the observation year. 
Explanatory variables. Our first explanatory variable is post policy. To construct this variable, 
we follow Singh and Agarwal (2011) and first construct an indicator variable of policy treatment. 
We regard an SOE as treated if its SIC3 industry classification belongs to the industrial categories 
that produced one or more products designated in the government procurement catalogs. (We 
provide more detailed discussion of how we constructed the treatment and the control samples in 
the next section.) For a treated SOE, the indicator variable post policy is defined as one for the 
observation years that fall after 2006, the year of the policy issuance, i.e., equal to or later than 
2007, and zero otherwise. For a non-treated SOE, post policy is always defined as zero. 
To measure the degree of alignment between agents’ private interests and firm value, we 
measure the proportion of board share as the percentage of firm shares owned by board members. 
The private incentives of board members shape how they monitor firm management and make 
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important decisions for the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In addition, the firm’s key decisions 
must be communicated to or approved by the board. Many top managers have also sat on boards 
(on average, top managers account for more than 39% of board members). As a robustness check, 
we also examine an alternative variable, namely, the percentage of board members who held any 
firm share. The results (available upon request) are consistent. To measure the degree of firm 
monitoring, we draw on the established approach in the blockholder literature where larger 
blockholders tend to exert extra effort in monitoring management because they have further 
interests at stake (e.g., Kochar & David, 1996; Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008). 
This finding follows that the higher the shares the state owns in an SOE, the greater the incentive 
the state has in monitoring the value of the SOE. Thus, we construct the proportion of state share, 
defined as the proportion of firm shares owned by the state. We regard an increased value for this 
variable to proxy for a higher degree of monitoring exercised by the state principal on SOEs. 
To measure the quality of public governance, existing literature offered three common 
approaches. The earliest approach relied on crude proxies, such as state revenue and expenditures 
(Rubinson, 1977) and the occurrence of political assassinations and revolutions (Barro, 1991) 
which were proven inadequate (e.g., Evans and Rauch, 1995). Later, Evans and Rauch (1999) and 
Rauch and Evans (2000) surveyed experts to assess selected features of government, such as the 
presence of meritocratic recruitment and career ladder. The advantage was that these measures 
directly assessed certain aspects of public governance. However, the downside was that they did 
not comprehensively assess all aspects theorized by the Weberian principle. The measures 
generated by Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000) covered a cross-sectional set 
of 35 countries in the 1990s, whereas subsequent research did not extend the data to cover other 
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governments and time periods. To the best of our knowledge, a measure generated in this tradition 
is unavailable for regional governments in China. 
The last approach, which is also the most popular and common one in the current literature, 
is to infer Weberian governance based on an array of outcomes produced when state actors carry 
out state functions efficiently without delays, corruption, or other distortions or when they fail to 
do so. Based on the Weberian theory of government quality, a high-quality government comes in 
a package in which multiple dimensions of government behavior are highly correlated. This 
finding means that a government that is increasingly accountable to public interest would also 
refrain from extracting from citizens and interfering in private businesses in multiple domains (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). The most prominent of these features is minimal 
corruption, strong protection of private property rights, and modest extraction from citizens. At 
the country level, scholars (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995) and policy institutions (e.g., the World 
Bank) actively followed this approach to produce and constantly update an array of government 
quality measures. We also follow this tradition to examine, instead of cross-country variation, the 
quality of governments across different regions within one country, namely, China. We generate 
a composite index using the following four sub-indices published by the NERI, each of which 
proxies for one or more of the aforementioned outcomes of government quality. 
The first sub-index was constructed by the NERI based on the percentage of nontax fees and 
charges on firms as a percentage of focal firms’ sales in the province and focal year. These levies 
fall outside the formal tax obligations of firms. Hence, they effectively capture the extent to which 
governments infringe on private property, a strong proxy of a low-quality government (e.g., 
Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). This sub-index was inversely constructed such that a high value 
indicates low nontax fees and charges levied by governments and, thus, not as much state 
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expropriation. The second sub-index was constructed based on nontax fees and charges on rural 
residents as a percentage of their annual income. Fees and charges on rural residents have been 
one of the major sources of revenue for local governments in China. In addition, they constitute 
the dominant financial burden of Chinese peasants, which has become one of the central issues 
that exemplify the excessive fiscal predation by local governments (e.g., Yep, 2004; Fan, Wang, 
& Zhu, 2011). The third sub-index was constructed based on annual nationwide surveys that polled 
the firms to rank the importance of dealing with government officials in their business operations 
relative to other business tasks. Firm-level responses were aggregated to the level of the province. 
Reduced time needed to deal with government officials is considered to indicate efficient or high-
quality government in China and other contexts (Fan et al., 2011). This standard question is 
adopted by surveys on government quality. For example, the World Bank Enterprise Survey also 
adopts the same approach of using managerial time spent on working through bureaucratic red 
tape to proxy for expropriation by government officials because bureaucratic red tape creates 
increased opportunities for state actors to seek private payments that infringe on firm private 
property across many emerging markets (Cull & Xu, 2005; Mako & Xu, 2006; Li et al., 2006; 
Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010; Spencer & Gomez, 2011). The fourth sub-index 
was constructed based on the excessive size of government employees (overstaffing), which 
increases the chance of government expropriation (Jia & Mayer, 2017). 
We conduct principal component analysis based on these four sub-indices each year and use 
the first component as the variable government quality in the focal year. Across all years, the 
average Eigenvalue of the first component is 1.72, explaining 43% of the variance. Average factor 
loadings of the four sub-indices are 0.68 for nontax fees and charges on firms as a percentage of 
focal firms’ sales, 0.31 for nontax fees and charges on rural residents as a percentage of their 
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annual income, 0.67 for the importance of dealing with government officials in business 
operations, and 0.09 for the excessive size of government employees.  
We establish two important points about this measure. First, we do not assert that each 
component alone proxies for how well governments serve as the principals of SOEs. Each 
component alone can be influenced by not only the quality of government, but also numerous less-
relevant factors. The use of the common variance of the multiple components is important, which 
is determined by government quality and does not contain the idiosyncratic determinants of each 
component. Second, the fundamental theoretical root of this approach is that multiple dimensions 
of government behavior are highly correlated in the tradition of Weber (1968). That is, a high-
quality government comes in a package: it effectively performs its role in advancing public interest 
(including managing SOEs) and, to a greater extent, refrains from infringing on the interest of 
private citizens. Therefore, although the sub-indices do not directly measure the management of 
SOEs, the variation captured by their common variance should proxy for the variation in how well 
governments perform their function as principals of SOEs. 
Control variables. We control for the following variables at the firm level: firm age (years 
since the firm’s founding), firm size (total assets), ROA (return on asset to proxy for firm 
performance), and market to book ratio. Given the importance of organizational slack in 
influencing firm innovation (e.g., Damanpour, 1991), we control for unabsorbed slack, which is 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities and potential slack, which is the ratio of debt to 
equity with a high value denoting less potential slack. To proxy and control for the firm’s 
innovative capability or capacity, we include the variable cumulative number of patents, which is 
the total number of patents that the firm has generated since the year of the firm’s establishment 
until the year before observation year. To control for other important characteristics of boards and 
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CEOs, we include the following variables in our models: government experience, which denotes 
the proportion of board members with experience working in government positions; independent 
director, which denotes the proportion of independent directors on the board; CEO and chairman 
duality, which indicates the overlap of CEO and Chairman of the board; and CEO Salary, which 
is a proxy for the CEO’s monetary incentives. 
We also included the following province–year-level control variables. Province GDP per 
capita captures the GDP per capita of a provincial-level region in a particular year. Province R&D 
expenditure captures the R&D expenditures made by independent research institutions, institutes 
of higher learning or universities, and large- and medium-sized enterprises of a provincial-level 
region (in 10,000 Yuan). Province market development is a NERI index that particularly measures 
how well product markets are developed in each provincial-level region in each year. The NERI 
constructed this index based on two sub-indices: (1) percentage of products with market-regulated 
prices and (2) degree of local trade protection (Fan et al., 2011; Li et al., 2006). With the exception 
of post policy, all explanatory and control variables are lagged by one year. We include firm fixed 
effects in all models. Table 1 summarizes the variables and their pairwise correlations. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Estimation Methods 
We follow prior research in employing a difference-in-differences identification approach 
(e.g., Murray & Stern, 2007; Singh & Agrawal, 2011), wherein we examine the interaction 
between policy treatment and governance variables. As discussed previously, the treatment group 
includes SOEs belonging to the industrial categories that produced one or more products 
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designated in the 2006 government procurement catalogs. We adopt propensity score matching9 
to construct a control group, namely, SOEs that did not belong to industrial categories whose 
products were designated in the procurement policy but were comparable to SOEs in the treatment 
group by matching the control group to the treatment group on key attributes including firm age, 
firm size, proportion of state share, cumulative number of patents, and year indicators. The 
difference in the numbers of patents produced by the treatment and control groups prior to the 
policy shock was not statistically significant, nor are the numbers of novel patents produced by 
them prior to the policy shock. This lends further support to the notion that the observable patenting 
behavior of the treatment and control firms is comparable. In the main models, we conduct 
difference-in-differences estimations for the full sample to compare the difference between the 
two groups of SOEs before and after the policy. In alternative models, we examine the differences 
among only SOEs in the treatment group before and after innovation policy. According to Singh 
and Agrawal (2011), this is a more stringent specification. This alternative model offers a direct 
test among the affected SOEs, which we consider comparable with one another in terms of the 
demand they face in developing patents and relevance of patenting to their businesses. 
The first dependent variable, number of patents, is a highly right-skewed count variable that 
takes on non-negative integer values. Hence, we use a nonlinear regression approach to avoid 
heteroskedastic, non-normal residuals (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). Specifically, we use 
conditional quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimates of the Poisson model with firm fixed 
effects (Hausman et al., 1984). The fixed-effects Poisson estimator produces consistent estimates 
of the parameters in an unobserved component multiplicative panel data model under very general 
conditions and provides consistent estimates of the conditional mean function even if the variances 
                                                          
9 In the propensity score matching procedure, we use a caliper of 0.15, which is sufficiently tight to produce close 
matches for efficiency. As a relatively large pool of untreated subjects from which to select from for the matching 
procedure exists, a tight caliper is appropriate. Robustness checks using a caliper of 0.20 or 0.25 yield similar results. 
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are mis-specified (Wooldridge, 1997). Robustness checks using negative binomial regression 
models yield consistent results. We also incorporate robust standard errors in the fixed-effects 
Poisson models based on Wooldridge (1997), where we use the Huber–White sandwich estimator 
(Greene, 2004) in all models to account for possible heteroskedasticity and lack of normality in 
error terms. QML (i.e., robust) standard errors are consistent even if the underlying data-generating 
process is not Poisson. 
The second dependent variable, proportion of novel patents, is computed as the number of 
novel patents divided by the total number of patents produced by firms in the given year which 
takes a value between 0 and 1. Thus, we use a double-censored Tobit model clustered by firm to 
account for possible correlations in errors for applying for novel patents within each firm. We also 
use robust standard errors to account for possible heteroscedasticity and lack of normality in the 
error terms (Greene, 2004). This approach follows prior studies and yields more consistent 
estimates of parameters than those of ordinary least squares (OLS) models (Long, 1997; McDonald 
& Moffitt, 1980; Tobin, 1958) because OLS models (inappropriately) treat the upper limit of the 
dependent variable (i.e., one) as actual values and not as the upper limit of the proportion of novel 
patents. We also include firm fixed effects throughout. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the results of the preferred models for the difference-in-differences estimation 
on the full sample that include the treated and control groups in Models 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, and 2-6, as 
well as the more stringent models that analyze the treated group only in Models 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, and 
2-8. As a point of comparison, we first examine the main effect of post policy along with the 
control variables, but without the interaction terms. The results show that, overall, the number of 
patents (Models 2-1 and 2-3) and proportion of novel patents (Models 2-5 and 2-7) increased after 
the implementation of policy. However, these changes should not be uniform according to our 
28 
 
 
hypotheses. Thus, we continue to examine their differential effects for various types of firms or 
regions—i.e., interaction effects. 
Table 2 also reports the results from estimating the interaction effect of post policy and 
proportion of board share, our measure of the incentive alignment of SOE agents. In predicting 
the outcome of the number of patents, the estimated coefficient of this interaction term for the full 
sample in Model 2-2 is negative and significant (p < 0.05), which is consistent with the prediction 
of H1a. For firms whose proportion of board share is at a moderate level (mean value), their patent 
production increased by 54.44% after the policy compared with before the policy. By contrast, for 
firms with high proportion of board share (one standard deviation above the mean), their patent 
production increased by a relatively smaller magnitude of 37.05% after the policy compared with 
before the policy. Therefore, firms with a moderate level of proportion of board share experienced 
a larger post-policy increase in patent production compared with the firms with a high level of 
proportion of board share, by a magnitude of close to 18 percentage points. As a robustness check, 
the estimation on the treatment group subsample in Model 2-4 yields highly similar results, 
wherein the interaction effect between post policy and proportion of board share is negative and 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) with a similar magnitude. These results suggest that although the 
policy produced a high quantity of patents generated by SOEs on average, this effect is not the 
same across all SOEs. The magnitude of this post-policy increase is notably small for SOEs, in 
which the private interests of their agents are aligned with firm value. Therefore, the results support 
H1a. 
We now turn to Models 2-6 (full sample) and 2-8 (treatment group only), which examine the 
proportion of novel patents produced by SOEs. In both models, the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction between post policy and proportion of board share is positive and significant (p < 0.01), 
29 
 
 
which supports a positive interaction effect, as predicted in H1b. Note that the policy increased the 
average proportion of novel patents overall, as the coefficient of post policy is positive and 
significant in models without interaction terms in Models 2-5 and 2-7 (recall that our hypothesis 
does not focus on this overall effect, but on the differential effects based on firm types). Given the 
overall positive effect of post policy on the proportion of novel patents, the positive interaction 
term between post policy and proportion of board share suggests that this increase tends to be 
large for firms with high proportion of board share. For example, in the full sample results in 
Model 2-6, firms whose proportion of board share is at a moderate level (mean value) after the 
policy increased the proportion of novel patents by a magnitude of 11.52% compared with the pre-
policy level, whereas firms whose proportion of board share is at a high level (one standard 
deviation above the mean) increased the proportion of novel patents by a much larger magnitude 
of 30.40% compared with that of the pre-policy level. In other words, the magnitude of post-policy 
increase in the proportion of novel patents is almost 19 percentage points higher for firms with 
better incentive alignment than for those with moderate incentive alignment. The results lend 
strong support to H1b. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the interaction effects between post policy and 
proportion of state share, which is a proxy for monitoring. This interaction effect is not statistically 
significant in predicting the number of patents (Models 3-2 and 3-4), which suggests that the 
overall increase in the quantity of patents after the policy does not appear to be affected by the 
proportion of state share in the SOEs. Thus, the results do not support H2a.  
However, Models 3-6 and 3-8 show that the interaction between post policy and proportion 
of state share is a positive and significant (p < 0.01) predictor of the proportion of novel patents 
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produced. Based on the full sample estimates reported in Model 3-6, SOEs with a moderate level 
of proportion of state share (mean value) increased the proportion of novel patents after the policy 
among all of its patents by a magnitude of 9.89% compared with the pre-policy level. SOEs with 
a high level of proportion of state share (one standard deviation above the mean) increased the 
proportion of novel patents among all its patents by a magnitude of 15.69%. In other words, the 
magnitude of the post-policy increase in the proportion of novel patents is larger by close to 6 
percentage points or 59 percent points greater for SOEs with a higher level of state shares than that 
for SOEs with a moderate level of state shares. These results support H2b. 
Thus far, the results suggest that SOEs whose board members’ private financial incentives 
were further aligned with firm value through increased shareholding and produced a small post-
policy increase in the quantity of general patents. These firms, together with the firms monitored 
to a great extent by the state through an enlarged state share, also produced a large post-policy 
increase in the proportion of novel patents among all patents. This evidence is consistent with our 
theory regarding the effect of incentive alignment on innovation. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the interaction effects of government quality and policy treatment 
indicator. In predicting the quantity of patents, we find that the coefficient of the interaction 
between post policy and government quality is positive for the full sample in Model 4-2 (p < 0.10) 
and for the treated sample in Model 4-4 (p < 0.05), which does not support H3a.  
Models 4-6 and 4-8 examine the interaction effects on the proportion of novel patents. In 
Model 4-6, the estimated interaction effect of post policy and government quality in the preferred 
full sample model is positive, as predicted by H2b, and statistically significant (p < 0.01). After 
the implementation of the policy, SOEs in provinces with moderate government quality (at the 
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mean value) increased the proportion of novel patents by about 10.33% compared with that of the 
pre-policy level. SOEs in provinces with high government quality (at one standard deviation above 
the mean) increased the proportion of novel patents by about 11.14% compared with that of the 
pre-policy level. Although the magnitude of the differential is close to one percentage point which 
is relatively small, it should be interpreted from the perspective of the average proportion of novel 
patents, which is only 2.8%. These results provide support for H3b. For the subsample of the 
treatment group in the SOE sample in Model 2-8, the interaction term is not statistically significant 
from zero. Overall, the results based on the main model suggest that the local government’s quality 
helped to further boost SOEs’ tendency to produce a large proportion of novel patents relative to 
general patents after policy implementation. 
Thus far, the results suggest that on average, the number of patents produced by the firms 
increased after the policy. However, this increase was smaller in magnitude for firms whose board 
held more shares, hence corroborating H1a. On average, the proportion of novel patents to all 
patents produced by the focal firm also increased after the policy. However, this increase was 
larger for firms under better governance such as those with higher proportion of board share and 
higher proportion of state share and located in provinces with higher-quality governments, which 
support H1b, H2b, and H3b. H2a and H3a are not supported, on which we offer more discussion 
later. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
To test the three-way interaction effects predicted by H4a to H4d, we adopt two approaches, 
namely, (1) conducting an analysis of two-way interactions in subsamples divided based on the 
third moderator, which offers the advantage of allowing the effects of other explanatory variables 
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to also vary based on the third variable and (2) including three-way interaction terms and all 
constitutive two-way interaction terms in a single model. 
Table 5 reports the results of the interaction effects of proportion of board share, post policy, 
and government quality. First, we compare the coefficients of the interaction terms, as 
demonstrated by the subsample analyses in Models 5-1 and 5-2, respectively. Next, we examine 
the three-way interaction term in Model 5-3. We find that the number of patents does not appear 
affected at conventional significance levels. Thus, we do not find support for H4a. 
Regarding the proportion of novel patents, the interaction between post policy and proportion 
of board share has a negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01) effect on SOEs located in 
provinces with low government quality (Model 5-4). However, this interaction effect is positive 
and significant (p < 0.01) for SOEs located in provinces with high government quality (Model 5-
5). These results suggest that the basic pattern in provinces with high-quality governments (Model 
5-4) is similar to that of the overall effect found in the full sample (Model 2-6) but with a much 
larger magnitude. However, the pattern appeared to be very different in provinces of low-quality 
governments (Model 5-4), in which the interaction between post policy and board share reduced 
the proportion of novel patents. The contrast of the two contexts produced is a positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) three-way interaction effect in a Mode 5-6. Overall, we find that 
the positive effect of board share on post-policy production of novel innovation is mainly driven 
by firms located in provinces with high-quality governments, which lends support to H4b.10   
Insert Table 5 about here 
                                                          
10 Nonetheless, the rich findings revealed one limitation. Our theory based on Holmstrom (1979) explains why, in a 
good institutional environment that has higher-quality governments, more-diligent agents (as a result of better 
corporate governance tools) are more likely to behave in ways that are consistent with promoting firm value. However, 
we do not have a theory about what happened in a bad institutional environment—in which corporate governance 
appeared to function in very different ways, as the empirical findings show. Although our theory hinges on explaining 
why firms in good institutional environments drive the results related to corporate governance and thus received 
support by the findings, we consider it a valuable quest to theorize particularly about what effect corporate governance 
produces (or a lack thereof) in a bad institutional environment. 
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Table 6 reports the results of the interaction effects of proportion of state share, post policy, 
and government quality on the quantity of patents. The two-way interaction between post policy 
and proportion of state share in predicting the quantity of patents is not statistically significant in 
either subsamples divided based on the median value of government quality (Models 6-1 and 6-2). 
However, the three-way interaction between post policy, proportion of state share, and government 
quality in Model 6-3 is a negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01) predictor of the number 
of patents, which is supports H4c, i.e., the negative effect of the interaction between post policy 
and proportion of state share on the number of patents should be more pronounced with greater 
government quality.  
In predicting the proportion of novel patents, the two-way interaction between post policy and 
proportion of state share remains positive and statistically significant in both subsamples of 
provinces with low (Model 6-4) and high (Model 6-5) values of government quality. However, the 
difference of this interaction effect between the two subsamples is miniscule and not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Model 6-6 shows that the three-way interaction term is not a 
statistically significant predictor of the proportion of novel patents. Hence, H4d is not supported. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
To summarize, all the hypotheses on the novelty of patents (Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b) 
received empirical support. Regarding the hypotheses on the overall quantity of patents, 
Hypotheses 1a and 4c were supported but Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, and 4d were not. Next, we offer 
a few thoughts on why the key estimates predicting the quantity of patents generally failed to be 
distinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels and how we can place the 
interpretations of our results in perspective. 
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We consider that our conservative approach of focusing only on invention patents that were 
eventually approved is much relevant to this outcome. Owing to this approach, our data include 
only the high-end invention patents in the entire spectrum of innovation. If in response to the 
national campaign, certain SOEs gamed the system by cranking out incremental technologies that 
did not meet the high patentability bar of invention patents (i.e., judged to have sufficient 
usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness; Wang et al., 2017); thus, they were filed as one of the 
other two low-quality categories of patents (see Footnote 8); our data, which do not include the 
other two categories of patents for low-quality technologies, will underestimate the post-policy 
frenzy of certain firms in terms of increasing the volume of patents at the expense of novelty. 
This conservative approach nonetheless helps further strengthen the interpretations of our 
results on patent novelty. Our findings show that even among the granted invention patents, which 
already passed the SIPO’s more-rigorous examinations for novelty and were more difficult to 
develop than the other two categories of patents, we continue to observe that the most cutting-edge 
patents declined in proportion after the policy among the SOEs that are under weak corporate or 
public governance. This result suggests that corporate and public governance exerts a very strong 
influence in shaping the novelty of firm innovation, even for SOEs that were already developing 
invention patents. 
Alternative Explanations 
Did the state simply seek to quickly accumulate incremental patents? A potential conjecture 
is that quickly developing less novel patents may simply be in the best interests of the Chinese 
state. Thus, SOEs may simply have followed the state’s instructions. However, this speculation is 
not consistent with the substantial empirical evidence that the state clearly and explicitly specified 
a strong desire to promote innovation and strong innovative capabilities in various policy 
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documents. To the best of our knowledge, the Chinese state has never even hinted that patent 
quantity is more important than patent quality or novelty or that the latter can or should be 
sacrificed in pursuit of the former. Instead, the Chinese state has always unambiguously advocated 
the ambition of becoming a nation with the strongest innovative capabilities. Thus, the first 
conjecture seems consistent with the content of policy documents and vast array of in-context 
anecdotal evidence. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that we cannot entirely rule out this alternative explanation. 
However, we distinguished between this conjecture and our theory based on the results of the 
variation in innovation outcomes, which depend on corporate and public governance. That is, 
focusing on the interaction effect of the post-policy indicator and measures of agency incentives 
helps address this concern. The alternative explanation cannot account for the interaction effects 
on which this study focuses. If the state indeed intentionally placed greater emphasis on the 
quantity of general patents more than their novelty, then this mandate should affect all SOEs across 
the board. However, our findings do not support this situation. Results regarding the interaction 
effects are more consistent with the agency-based explanation than the alternative explanation. 
Can government contracts nullify firms’ need to become truly innovative? The second 
challenge to the agency-based explanation is that even if agents’ interests were fully aligned with 
firm interests (i.e., in the absence of agency risk), agents are not required to care about achieving 
a balance between less-novel and novel patents to improve their firm’s innovativeness and 
competitiveness which contribute to firm value in market competition, provided that firms can be 
entirely shielded from market competition. This insulation from market competition may be 
achieved by obtaining all business from government contracts through this public policy, which, 
after all, is the “carrot” used by the state in this very policy instrument. 
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However, this explanation does not explain the main findings, i.e., that innovation behavior 
differs for SOEs with varying degrees of agency risk. Second, the need to compete in the market 
is not eliminated for most firms in our sample. For products included in the government 
procurement catalogs, significant growth opportunities exist owing to the large and growing 
market demand beyond government contracts. These are not simply any types of products. Many 
of these products belong to core manufacturing industrial categories for which large domestic and 
international markets are available. In addition, a notable proportion of them are technology-
intensive products in fast-growing markets (see Online Appendix A). Furthermore, government 
procurement contracts issued owing to the pro-innovation policies is not guaranteed and would 
continue in the long term. The state clarified that its intention was not to secure suppliers for these 
contracts, but to use these contracts to induce notable innovation. Thus, several SOEs would 
continue to expect to compete for market demand even with government contracts. Therefore, the 
true innovative capabilities and competitiveness of firms still mattered, thereby weakening the 
plausibility of this alternative explanation. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Innovation research often distinguishes true innovation from observable outcomes such as 
patents (Van de Ven, 1986; Gupta, Tesluk, & Taylor, 2007; Huang & Murray, 2009). The two 
notions are not fully aligned despite having high correlations. This paper examines how agency 
risk can contribute to one type of misalignment, that agents who are affected by greater moral 
hazard—shaped by corporate and public governance—pursue the observable quantity of 
innovation at the expense of the novelty. 
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We find that after the state issued the major pro-innovation policy in 2006 in China, Chinese 
SOEs responded differently depending on their corporate governance and the public governance 
of the governments that control them. SOEs whose board members held fewer shares (thus having 
less incentive alignment) and those with smaller proportions of state share (thus creating weaker 
monitoring by the state principal), and SOEs located in provinces with lower-quality public 
governance produced a smaller post-policy increase in the proportion of novel patents. SOEs 
whose board members held more shares also produced larger post-policy increase in the quantity 
of patents. However, the distinction of firms created by their state shares and quality of their local 
governments did not appear to affect the post-policy increase in the quantity of patents, for which 
we offered certain explanations based on our criteria of selecting the sample.  
Moreover, the finding that board shares produced a large post-policy increase in the 
proportion of novel patents appeared to be mainly driven by SOEs located in provinces with high-
quality governments but not by the SOEs located in provinces with low quality governments. This 
scenario is consistent with the theory that good political governance of the state principal enhances 
the effect of good corporate governance of SOE agents. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
First, it is challenging for firms to manage innovation because of asymmetric information and 
greater uncertainty in measurement, so agency risk is rife. Prior research on agency risk in 
innovation mostly focused on how agents shirk and thus underinvest in innovation (e.g., Cohen & 
Levin, 1989; Zenger, 1994). This study demonstrates a different form of agency risk that affected 
the deployment of resources instead of reducing investment in innovation. Here, affected agents 
prioritize producing a larger quantity of innovation at the expense of quality. This insight provides 
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a plausible mechanism for the findings in prior research that under higher agency risk, inputs into 
innovation less effectively contribute to firm value (e.g., He and Wang, 2009; Zhou et al., 2017). 
Moreover, our distinction between the quantity and novelty of innovation expand the 
predominant focus on agents’ underinvestment in innovation across the board (e.g., Baysinger et 
al., 1991; Kochhar & David, 1996; Lee & O’Neill, 2003; David et al., 2008). Our distinction of 
different innovation outcomes—the production of general or novel patents, is important for the 
following reasons. First, it is a critical feature that directly shapes how firm innovation eventually 
affects firm value (e.g., Mitchell, 1989, Henderson & Clark, 1990, Cockburn, 2004). Second, it 
contributes to the conceptual notion that agency risk affects how agents deploy innovation 
activities (He and Wang, 2009) by providing a theoretical mechanism. Third, this paper provides 
the first systematic examination of the distinction between the quantity and novelty of innovation 
in China, whereas previous discussion of this important issue was based on anecdotal evidence.   
Second, this study also contributes to the theory of corporate governance. While corporate 
governance literature traditionally focuses on regulating the behavior of agents, recent research 
also recognizes the importance of governance of principals. For example, the national traditions in 
terms of the prevailing ownership types, national value, and governance logics influence how 
much principals hold agents accountable (e.g., Crossland and Hambrick, 2007; Crossland & Chen, 
2013; Desender et al., 2016). Consistent with this direction, we show that, as part of a high-quality 
government, public officials effectively fulfill their role as principals of SOEs to reduce agents’ 
moral hazard in the SOEs, which directly and further utilizes corporate governance tools. This 
study contributes to the frontier research that aims to understand why the effectiveness of the same 
corporate governance mechanisms appears to vary across the institutional environment because 
public governance is a core component of the institutional context (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015). 
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Third, we contribute to the research on state capitalism by addressing the following tension. 
Several researchers argued that states are long-term oriented and use SOEs to achieve their goals, 
such as building innovative capabilities (Munari et al., 2010). Thus, these scholars have predicted 
that state ownership increases innovation in SOEs (Choi et al., 2011). However, these scholars 
suggest that state-controlled firms lack the abilities to appreciate innovation and show less 
innovation than privately owned firms (e.g., Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998). Zhou et al. (2017) 
provides a summary of this debate. We reconcile this tension by providing the following insights: 
despite promotion by the state, SOEs that suffer from great agency risk continue to lack an inherent 
interest in increasing firm value through engagement with innovation. However, it does not 
necessarily manifest as less innovation, but rather as a lopsided focus on the quantity of innovative 
outcomes at the expense of novelty. Therefore, the ability of the state as principal to increase SOEs’ 
innovativeness is more intricate than suggested by prior research. 
 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
These findings also generate important managerial and policy implications. Producing a large 
quantity of patents in itself may not be detrimental to firm innovativeness and value. However, if 
the proportion of novel patents produced is also lower, then firm-level problems can arise for the 
following reason. Although scholars and practitioners believe that firms must achieve a balanced 
mix of incremental and novel innovation, most Chinese SOEs were unlikely to have previously 
already been in the position of overproducing novel patents prior to the policy change. Thus, 
scaling back novel patents or developing them at disproportionately slower rates than incremental 
patents is unlikely to be the optimal method of achieving the top level of firm innovativeness and 
value. Our study suggests that corporate and public governance tools appear to have reduced the 
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extent of the asymmetric effect on the quantity and novelty of patents produced by the SOEs. 
Therefore, we conclude that replicating the market for innovation may be difficult for the state 
because of two challenges: (1) the divergent interests of SOE agents, which can be modified by 
multiple governance mechanisms, and (2) the inability of the state to design precise evaluation 
metrics that induce the types of managerial actions that contribute to ultimate firm value. 
Another implication for the governance and innovation literature is that improved corporate 
governance, high-quality public governance, and their interaction effect can improve the 
proportion of novel patents in firms without a proportionate increase in incremental patents. To 
the extent that an increase in novel patents tends to correspond with a rise in the number of 
incremental patents, our finding provides a more nuanced view to refine this understanding. 
Future Research 
We primarily focused on SOEs in this paper since public governance directly affects how 
effective state officials perform the state’s role as the principals of SOEs. We consider studying 
this type of moral hazard in the innovation of privately owned enterprises an interesting and fruitful 
venue for future research. First, the general theory of the effect of corporate governance on firm 
innovation should, in principle, be applicable to privately owned enterprises given that incentive 
alignment and monitoring are also general theoretical tools, which address agency risk in privately 
owned firms. Second, the governance of the principals of privately owned enterprises, even though 
it may not be public governance, such as those determined by different types of ownership (e.g., 
Desender et al., 2016), should also matter to firm innovation outcomes. 
Although objective evaluation metrics in innovation does not always rely on firms’ financial 
results, the notion of adopting metrics shares certain similarities with financial control with which 
managers assess the business primarily based on financial performance data. Research showed that 
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tight financial control led to low-risk, short-term orientation, which in turn decreased the overall 
R&D innovation of firms (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). Future research can investigate whether 
financial control would also shape the composition of innovation above and beyond the overall 
amount of R&D, thereby connecting innovation research to the literature on corporate control and 
multidivisional firms. 
 
REFERENCES 
Abrami, R. M., Kirby, W. C., & McFarlan, F. W. 2014. Why China Cannot Innovate. Harvard 
Business Review, March: 2-6. 
Acemoglu, D. & Johnson, S. 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 
113(5): 949-995. 
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. 2015. Connecting the Dots: Bringing 
External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle. Academy of 
Management Annals, 9(1): 483-573. 
Amsden, A. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baker, G. 1992. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100: 598-614. 
Barro, R. J. 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106: 407-444. 
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure 
on Corporate R&D Strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 205-214. 
Bebchuk, L. A. & Stole, L. A. 1993. Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment 
in Long-Term Projects? Journal of Finance, 48(2): 719-729. 
Beatty, R.P., & Zajac, E.J. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of 
executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2): 313-335. 
Cai, H., Fang, H., & Xu, L. C. 2011. Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of 
Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 54(1): 55-78. 
Choi, S. B., Lee, S. H., & Williams, C. 2011. Ownership and firm innovation in a transition 
economy: Evidence from China. Research Policy, 40: 441-452. 
Cockburn, I. M. 2004. The Changing Structure of The Pharmaceutical Industry. Health Affairs, 
23(1): 10-22. 
Cohen, W. M. & Levin, R. C. 1989. Empirical studies of innovation and market structure. In R. 
Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization, Vol. 2: 1059–1107. 
Tokyo: North-Holland. 
42 
 
 
Crossland, C. & Hambrick, D. 2007. How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate 
executives: a study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic Management Journal, 28(8): 
767-789. 
Crossland, C. & Chen, G. 2013. Executive accountability around the world: Sources of cross-
national variation in firm performance–CEO dismissal sensitivity. Strategic Organization, 
11(1): 78-109. 
Cull, R. & Xu, L. C. 2005. Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Profit 
Reinvestment among Chinese Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 117–146. 
Damanpour, F. 1991. Organizational innovation: A meta-analysis of effects of determinants and 
moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3): 555-590. 
David, P., O'Brien, J. P., & Yoshikawa, T. 2008. The Implications of Debt Heterogeneity for R&D 
Investment and Firm Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 51(1): 165-181. 
Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Lópezpuertas-Lamy, M., & Crespi, R. 2016. A clash of 
governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 
37(349-369). 
Dharwadkar, R., Goranova, M., Brandes, P., & Khan, R. 2008. Institutional Ownership and 
Monitoring Effectiveness: It’s Not Just How Much but What Else You Own. Organization 
Science, 19(3): 419–440. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(1): 57-74. 
Evans, P. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Evans, P. & Rauch, J. 1999. Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross National Analysis of the Effects 
of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth. American Sociological Review, 64(5): 
748-765. 
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. 2011. NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2011 
Report. Beijing, China: Economics Science Press. 
Feltham, G. A. & Xie, J. 1994. Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task 
principal /agent relations. Accounting Review, 69(3): 429-453. 
Fisman, R. & Wang, Y. 2017. The distortionary effects of incentives in government: Evidence 
from China's "death ceiling" program. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 
Forthcoming. 
Fleming, L. 2001. Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management Science, 
47(117-132). 
Fleming, L. 2007. Breakthroughs and the “Long Tail” of Innovation. Sloan Management Review, 
49(1): 69-74. 
Fleming, L., Mingo, S., & Chen, D. 2007. Collaborative Brokerage, Generative Creativity, and 
Creative Success. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(3): 443-475. 
Gans, J. S., Hsu, D. H., & Stern, S. 2008. The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on 
the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays. Management Science, 54(5): 982-
997. 
Goranova, M., Alessandri, T. M., Brandes, P., & Dharwardkar, R. 2007. Managerial ownership 
and corporate diversification: A longitudinal view. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 211-
225. 
Gibbons, R. 1987. Piece-rate incentive schemes. Journal of Labor Economics, 5: 413–429. 
Gibbons, R. 1998. Incentives in organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12: 115-132. 
43 
 
 
Gibbons, R. 2005. Incentives Between Firms (and Within). Management Science, 51(1): 2-17. 
Greene, W. 2004. Fixed effects and the incidental parameters problem in the Tobit Model. 
Econometric Reviews, 23: 125-147. 
Greve, H. R., & Zhang, C. M. 2017. Institutional Logics and Power Sources: Merger and 
Acquisition Decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 60 (2): 671-694. 
Hart, O. & Holmstrom, B. 1986. The Theory of Contracts, Working papers 418, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. 
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an 
Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4): 1127-1161. 
Hausman, J. A., Hall, B. H., & Griliches, Z. 1984. Econometric models for count data with an 
application to the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica, 52: 909-938. 
He, J. & Wang, H. C. 2009. Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The 
Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5): 
919-938. 
Henderson, R. & Clark, K. 1990. Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing product 
technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 9-30. 
Hillman, A. J. & Dalziel, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency 
and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3): 383-396. 
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 
74-91. 
Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom, P. 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, 
Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7: 24-52. 
Hoskisson, R. E. & Hitt, M. A. 1988. Strategic control systems and relative R&D investment in 
large multiproduct firms. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6): 605-621. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. 2002. Conflicting voices: The 
effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on corporate 
innovation strategies. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 697-716. 
Hu, A. G. & Jefferson, G. H. 2009. A great wall of patents: What is behind China's recent patent 
explosion? Journal of Development Economics, 90: 57-68. 
Huang, K. G. & Murray, F. E. 2009. Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-run Supply of Public 
Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics. Academy of Management Journal, 52(6): 1193-
1221  
Huang, K. G. 2010. China’s Innovation Landscape. Science, 329(5992): 632-633. 
Huang, K.G. & Ertug, G. 2014. Mobility, retention and productivity of genomics scientists in the 
U.S. Nature Biotechnology, 32(9): 953-958. 
Huang, K.G. 2017. Uncertain intellectual property conditions and knowledge appropriation 
strategies: Evidence from the genomics industry. Industrial and Corporate Change, 26(1): 41-
71. 
Huang, K.G., Geng, X., & Wang, H. 2017. Institutional regime shift in intellectual property rights 
and innovation strategies of firms in China. Organization Science, 28(2): 355-377. 
Jia, N. 2014. Are collective and private political actions substitutes or complements? Empirical 
evidence from China’s private sector. Strategic Management Journal, 35(2): 292-315. 
Jia, N. & Mayer, K. 2017. Political hazards and firms’ geographic concentration. Strategic 
Management Journal, 38(2): 203–231. 
Johnson, C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
44 
 
 
Katila, R. 2000. Measuring innovation performance. International Journal of Business 
Performance Measurement, 2: 180-193. 
Kerr, S. 1975. On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 
18: 769–783. 
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. 1995. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7(3): 207-227. 
Kochhar, R. & David, P. 1996. Institutional investors and firm innovation: A test of competing 
hypotheses. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 73–84. 
Kor, Y. & Mahoney, J. 2005. How dynamics, management, and governance of resource 
deployments influence firm-level performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(5): 489-
496. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1999. The quality of government. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1): 222-279. 
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Weigelt, K. 1993. The structure of organizational incentives. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3): 438-461. 
Lee, P. M. & O'Neill, H. M. 2003. Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. and 
Japanese firms: Agency and stewardship perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 
46(2): 212-225. 
Lei, Z. & Sun, Z. B. W. 2013. Patent subsidy and patent filing in China, Working paper, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
Li, J. & Qian, C. 2013. Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate 
takeovers in China. Strategic Management Journal, 34(3): 498–508. 
Liang, M. 2012. Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies. The John 
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 11: 478-522. 
Lippman, S. A. & Rumelt, R. P. 1982. Uncertain imitability: An analysis of inter-firm differences 
in efficiency under competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 418-438. 
Long, J. S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Mako, W. & Xu, C. 2006. China: Governance, investment climate, and harmonious society: 
competitiveness enhancements for 120 cities in China, Report number 37759-CN, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management, Financial and Private Sector Development Unit, 
East Asia and Pacific Region. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/Resources/318862-
1121421293578/120cities_en.pdf (accessed 8 June 2014). 
McDonald, J. F. & Moffitt, R. A. 1980. The Uses of Tobit Analysis. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 62(2): 318-321. 
Misangyi, V. M. & Acharya, A. G. 2014. Substitutes or complements? A configurational 
examination of corporate governance mechanisms. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6): 
1681-1705. 
Mitchell, W. 1989. Whether and when? Probability and timing of incumbent’s entry into emerging 
industrial subfields. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(208-230). 
Munari, F., Oriani, R., & Sobrero, M. 2010. The effects of owner identity and external governance 
systems on R&D investments: A study of Western European firms. Research Policy, 39: 1093–
1104. 
45 
 
 
Murray, F. & Stern, S. 2007. Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific 
knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 63: 648–687. 
North, D. C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company  
Oi, J. 1989. State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village 
Government. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Polanyi, K. [1944]1957. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon. 
Prendergast, C. 1999. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 
37(1): 7-63. 
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., & Manin, B. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rauch, J. & Evans, P. 2000. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic performance in Less 
Developed Countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75: 49-62. 
Rubinson, R. 1977. Dependence, Government Revenue and Economic Growth, 1995-1970. 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 12: 3-28. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52: 737–
783. 
Shleifer, A. 1998. State versus Private Ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12: 133–
150. 
Singh, J. & Agrawal, A. 2011. Recruiting for Ideas: How Firms Exploit the Prior Inventions of 
New Hires. Management Science, 51(7): 129-150. 
Spencer, J. & Gomez, C. 2011. MNEs and corruption: the impact of national institutions and 
subsidiary strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 280-300. 
Tobin, J. 1958. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica, 26: 24-
36. 
Tonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M., & Perlitz, M. 2010. Corruption and entrepreneurship: 
how formal and informal institutions shape small firm behavior in transition and mature market 
economies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(5): 803-831. 
Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
Wang, H. & Qian, C. 2011. Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance: the roles 
of stakeholder response and political access. Academy of Management Journal, 54(6): 1159–
1181. 
Wang, Y., Li, J., & Furman, J. 2017. Firm performance and state innovation funding: Evidence 
from China’s Innofund Program. Research Policy, Forthcoming. 
Weber, M. 1968. Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster. 
Wooldridge, J. M. 1997. Quasi-likelihood Methods for Count Data. In M. H. Pesaran & P. Schmidt 
(Eds.), Handbook of Applied Econometrics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Xu, C. 2011. The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 49(4): 1076-1151. 
Xu, K., Tihanyi, L., & Hitt, M. A. 2017. Firm Resources, Governmental Power, and Privatization. 
Journal of Management, 43(4): 998-1024. 
Yep, R. 2004. Can “Tax-for-Fee” Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, Progress 
and Limitations. The China Quarterly, 177: 42-70. 
46 
 
 
Zaltman, G., Duncan, R., & Holbek, J. 1973. Innovations and organizations. New York, NY: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Zenger, T. R. 1994. Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems 
and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size. Management Science, 
40(6): 708-729. 
Zhang, C. M., & Greve, H. R. 2016. Delayed Adoption of Rules: A Relational Theory of Firm 
Exposure and State Cooptation. Journal of Management, forthcoming: 0149206316673719. 
Zhou, K. Z., Gao, G. Y., & Zhao, H. 2017. State ownership and firm innovation in China: An 
integrated view of institutional and efficiency logics. Administrative Science Quarterly, 62(2): 
375- 404. 
 
47 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
       Table 1. Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
 Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 .Number of patents 2.83 23.05                    
2. Proportion of novel patents 0.028 0.12 0.07                   
3. Post policy 0.25 0.44 0.07 0.07                  
4. Proportion of board share 0.18 1.60 −0.00 −0.01 0.07                 
5. Proportion of state share 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.02 −0.15 −0.04                
6. Government quality 0.41 1.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05               
7. Firm age 10.33 4.91 −0.01 −0.01 0.30 −0.04 −0.09 0.09              
8. Firm size 21.49 1.19 0.26 0.09 0.14 −0.04 0.03 −0.00 0.17             
9. ROA 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.09 −0.02 0.01 −0.13 0.14            
10. Market to book ratio 1.84 1.45 −0.04 −0.03 −0.00 0.08 −0.02 −0.02 −0.12 −0.39 0.17           
11. Unabsorbed slack 1.67 2.04 −0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.21 −0.06 −0.02 −0.12 −0.14 0.16 0.22          
12. Potential slack 2.11 23.16 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03         
13. Cumulative number of 
patents 
10.41 96.84 0.89 0.04 0.07 −0.00 0.07 −0.01 0.02 0.24 0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.00        
14. Government experience 0.32 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.32 0.03 −0.12 0.03 0.38 0.27 0.00 −0.18 −0.04 0.01 0.08       
15. Independent director 0.28 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.31 0.04 −0.12 0.05 0.42 0.24 −0.04 −0.28 −0.06 0.00 0.04 0.55      
16.CEO and Chairman duality 0.30 0.46 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.00 −0.05 −0.05     
17.CEO salary 334113 469326 0.08 0.03 0.20 0.07 −0.12 −0.01 0.24 0.41 0.14 −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.01    
18. Province GDP per capita 27373 20106 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.07 −0.07 0.07 0.36 0.27 0.04 −0.00 0.02 −0.01 0.10 0.27 0.29 −0.05 0.38   
19. Province R&D 
expenditure 
2352962 4770786 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.06 −0.07 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.02 −0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.04 0.15 0.16 −0.00 0.21 0.41  
20. Province market 
development 
7.79 1.51 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.35 0.26 0.12 −0.01 −0.13 −0.05 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.26 −0.07 0.13 0.23 0.15 
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Table 2. Effects of Post-policy and Board Share on Quantity and Novelty of Patents 
Model 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 
DV FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) 
 
Number of 
patents 
Number of 
patents Number of patents Number of patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of 
Novel Patents 
Proportion of Novel 
Patents 
Sample 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group of 
SOE only (no 
control group) 
Proportion of board 
share × Post policy 
 −0.100*  −0.083**  0.118**  1.107** 
 (0.050)  (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Proportion of board 
share 
0.031 0.105 0.015 0.083+ −0.030** −0.139** −0.028** −1.130** 
(0.057) (0.065) (0.052) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post policy 0.441** 0.446** 0.631** 0.635** 0.096** 0.094** 0.168** 0.156** 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.104) (0.104) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm age 0.115** 0.114** 0.061 0.060 0.015** 0.015** −0.006** −0.007** 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.601** 0.602** 0.788** 0.789** 0.029** 0.030** 0.043** 0.047** 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.202) (0.203) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State share 0.444** 0.445** −0.030 −0.030 0.231** 0.231** 0.176** 0.175** 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.258) (0.258) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA −0.398 −0.368 −0.398 −0.387 1.721** 1.722** 1.956** 1.950** 
(0.705) (0.699) (0.713) (0.715) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
Market to book ratio 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.013 −0.029** −0.029** −0.046** −0.045** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.009 0.012 −0.030 −0.025 0.007** 0.007** 0.001 0.001 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential slack −0.019 −0.019 −0.060 −0.060 −0.003** −0.003** −0.000 −0.000 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.042) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative number of 
patents 
0.000 0.000 −0.001** −0.001** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government experience −0.013 −0.015 0.492** 0.491** 0.158** 0.159** 0.212** 0.213** 
(0.210) (0.210) (0.164) (0.164) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Independent director 1.337* 1.340* 0.975 0.979 0.447** 0.445** 0.200** 0.188** 
(0.599) (0.596) (0.624) (0.622) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO and chairman 
duality 
0.066 0.065 −0.061 −0.062 −0.078** −0.078** −0.044** −0.044** 
(0.136) (0.137) (0.154) (0.155) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO salary 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province GDP per capita −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province R&D 
expenditure 
0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province market 
development 
0.102 0.102 0.157+ 0.157+ 0.011** 0.011** −0.023** −0.022** 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,676 3,676 2,539 2,539 6,622 6,622 3,324 3,324 
Log pseudolikelihood −7499 −7493 −5727 −5723 −1118 −1117 −808 −807 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and include constant. Models 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, and 2-7 are identical to Models 3-1, 3-3, 3-5, and 3-7, respectively. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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Table 3. Effects of Post-policy and State Share on Quantity and Novelty of Patents 
Model  3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 
DV FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) 
 
Number of 
patents 
Number of 
patents Number of patents 
Number of  
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of Novel 
Patents 
Proportion of 
Novel Patents 
Sample 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group of 
SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Proportion of state share 
× Post policy 
 −0.034  0.116  0.291**  0.295** 
 (0.327)  (0.325)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Proportion of state share 0.444** 0.462 −0.030 −0.109 0.231** 0.143** 0.176** 0.051** 
(0.170) (0.289) (0.258) (0.419) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) 
Post policy 0.441** 0.447** 0.631** 0.609** 0.096** 0.066** 0.168** 0.125** 
(0.124) (0.127) (0.104) (0.118) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of board share 0.031 0.030 0.015 0.016 −0.030** −0.029** −0.028** −0.028** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.115** 0.114** 0.061 0.064 0.015** 0.016** −0.006** −0.003** 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.601** 0.602** 0.788** 0.784** 0.029** 0.023** 0.043** 0.040** 
(0.172) (0.176) (0.202) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA −0.398 −0.402 −0.398 −0.395 1.721** 1.725** 1.956** 1.942** 
(0.705) (0.700) (0.713) (0.721) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
Market to book ratio 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.011 −0.029** −0.028** −0.046** −0.044** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.009 0.009 −0.030 −0.029 0.007** 0.007** 0.001 −0.000 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential slack −0.019 −0.019 −0.060 −0.060 −0.003** −0.003** −0.000 0.000 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative number of 
patents 
0.000 0.000 −0.001** −0.002** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government experience −0.013 −0.014 0.492** 0.496** 0.158** 0.154** 0.212** 0.204** 
(0.210) (0.210) (0.164) (0.162) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Independent director 1.337* 1.342* 0.975 0.950 0.447** 0.435** 0.200** 0.181** 
(0.599) (0.621) (0.624) (0.596) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO and chairman 
duality 
0.066 0.063 −0.061 −0.054 −0.078** −0.081** −0.044** −0.047** 
(0.136) (0.140) (0.154) (0.163) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO salary 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province GDP per capita −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province R&D 
expenditure 
0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province market 
development 
0.102 0.101 0.157+ 0.157+ 0.011** 0.010** −0.023** −0.025** 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,676 3,676 2,539 2,539 6,622 6,622 3,324 3,324 
Log pseudolikelihood −7499 −7499 −5727 −5726 −1118 −1116 −808 −807 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and include constant. Models 2-1, 2-3, 2-5, and 2-7 are identical to Models 3-1, 3-3, 3-5, and 3-7, respectively. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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Table 4. Effects of Post-policy and Government Quality on Quantity and Novelty of Patents 
Model 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 
DV FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) 
 
Number of 
patents 
Number of 
patents Number of patents 
Number of  
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Proportion of novel 
patents 
Sample 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
All samples 
(preferred 
model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
All samples 
(preferred model) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Subsample of 
treatment group 
of SOE only (no 
control group) 
Government quality × 
Post-policy 
 0.222+  0.251*  0.008**  −0.002 
 (0.115)  (0.122)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Government quality 0.014 −0.060 −0.041 −0.165+ 0.049** 0.047** 0.049** 0.050** 
(0.064) (0.061) (0.090) (0.097) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Post-policy 0.448** 0.328* 0.613** 0.451** 0.104** 0.100** 0.183** 0.185** 
(0.125) (0.146) (0.106) (0.126) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Proportion of state share 0.441* 0.446** −0.025 0.008 0.225** 0.224** 0.165** 0.165** 
(0.175) (0.170) (0.255) (0.255) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Firm age 0.112** 0.112** 0.068 0.074 0.009** 0.008** −0.015** −0.015** 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.053) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.600** 0.598** 0.790** 0.786** 0.027** 0.027** 0.044** 0.044** 
(0.170) (0.164) (0.203) (0.196) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA −0.406 −0.375 −0.426 −0.446 1.662** 1.661** 1.900** 1.900** 
(0.706) (0.713) (0.704) (0.702) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Market to book ratio 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.010 −0.029** −0.029** −0.047** −0.047** 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.009 0.012 −0.032 −0.032 0.008** 0.008** 0.002* 0.002* 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential slack −0.019 −0.020 −0.060 −0.062 −0.003** −0.003** −0.001 −0.001 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative number of 
patents 
0.000 −0.000 −0.002** −0.002** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government experience −0.019 0.020 0.494** 0.522** 0.151** 0.151** 0.206** 0.206** 
(0.205) (0.196) (0.163) (0.170) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Independent director 1.334* 1.310* 0.992 0.948 0.433** 0.434** 0.183** 0.183** 
(0.609) (0.598) (0.637) (0.626) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO and chairman duality 0.063 0.071 −0.057 −0.035 −0.078** −0.077** −0.042** −0.042** 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.155) (0.155) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO salary 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province GDP per capita −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province R&D 
expenditure 
0.000+ 0.000 0.000* 0.000+ 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province market 
development 
0.101 0.138 0.157+ 0.215* 0.011** 0.012** −0.021** −0.021** 
(0.093) (0.099) (0.095) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,676 3,676 2,539 2,539 6,622 6,622 3,324 3,324 
Log pseudolikelihood −7499 −7478 −5725 −5704 −1117 −1117 −807 −807 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and include constant. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1 
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Table 5. Effects of Post-Policy, Board Share, and Government Quality on Quantity and Novelty of Patents  
Model 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6 
 FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) 
DV Number of patents Number of patents Number of patents Proportion of novel patents Proportion of novel patents Proportion of novel patents 
Sample (both treatment and control 
groups included) 
Subsample of firms 
in provinces with 
low gov quality 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with high 
gov quality All samples 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with low gov 
quality 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with high  gov 
quality All samples 
Government quality ×Proportion of 
board share × Post policy 
  0.154   2.336** 
  (0.153)   (0.001) 
Proportion of board share × Post policy −0.045 −0.137 −0.280 −0.113** 6.337** −0.600** 
(0.116) (0.126) (0.179) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government quality ×Proportion of 
board share 
  −0.240   −2.387** 
  (0.167)   (0.001) 
Government quality × Post policy   0.222+   −0.010** 
  (0.116)   (0.003) 
Government quality   −0.055   0.073** 
  (0.061)   (0.002) 
Proportion of board share 0.131 0.110 0.375+ 0.032** −6.347** 0.647** 
(0.121) (0.107) (0.219) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post policy 0.443* 0.468** 0.337* 0.071** 0.078** 0.108** 
(0.188) (0.126) (0.145) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of state share 0.320 0.340 0.446** −0.052** 0.468** 0.214** 
(0.283) (0.318) (0.170) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm age 0.074 0.193** 0.111* −0.010** 0.048** 0.006** 
(0.059) (0.072) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.546** 0.750** 0.592** 0.094** −0.016** 0.026** 
(0.174) (0.244) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA −2.002* 0.919 −0.288 0.841** 2.482** 1.598** 
(0.983) (1.136) (0.676) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) 
Market to book ratio 0.014 0.038 0.006 0.020** −0.063** −0.032** 
(0.055) (0.038) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.101+ 0.013 0.010 0.031** −0.019** 0.008** 
(0.052) (0.090) (0.043) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential slack −0.111** −0.006 −0.021 −0.002** −0.002** −0.003** 
(0.032) (0.009) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative number of patents 0.000 −0.002** −0.000 −0.000** −0.001** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government experience 0.122 0.611* 0.016 0.279** 0.145** 0.149** 
(0.220) (0.268) (0.198) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Independent director 2.606** 0.196 1.306* 0.725** −0.407** 0.455** 
(0.898) (0.809) (0.593) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
CEO and chairman duality 0.144 −0.199 0.064 −0.101** −0.045** −0.081** 
(0.168) (0.122) (0.138) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
CEO salary −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province GDP per capita 0.000 −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province R&D expenditure −0.000** 0.000** 0.000 −0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province market development −0.000 0.147 0.143 −0.018** 0.039** 0.014** 
(0.087) (0.136) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,525 1,822 3,676 3,263 3,359 6,622 
Log pseudolikelihood −2796 −3348 −7456 −422 −577 −1113 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and include constant. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1 
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Table 6. Effects of Post-policy, State Share, and Government Quality on Quantity and Novelty of Patents  
Model 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 
 FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) Tobit (firm FE) 
DV Number of Patents Number of Patents Number of Patents Proportion of Novel Patents Proportion of Novel Patents Proportion of Novel Patents 
Sample (both treatment and control 
groups included) 
Subsample of firms 
in provinces with 
low gov quality 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with high gov 
quality 
All samples 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with low gov 
quality 
Subsample of firms in 
provinces with high gov 
quality 
All samples 
Government quality × Proportion of 
state share × Post policy 
  −0.511**   −0.003 
  (0.195)   (0.015) 
Proportion of state share × Post policy 0.307 −0.325 0.133 0.334** 0.291** 0.301** 
(0.496) (0.317) (0.353) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Government quality × Proportion of 
state share 
  0.079   −0.007 
  (0.156)   (0.007) 
Government quality × Post policy   0.283*   0.015** 
  (0.130)   (0.003) 
Government quality   −0.092   0.047** 
  (0.078)   (0.002) 
Proportion of state share 0.110 0.488 0.377 −0.184** 0.389** 0.137** 
(0.451) (0.384) (0.334) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Post policy 0.391* 0.522** 0.302* 0.032** 0.084** 0.066** 
(0.185) (0.153) (0.145) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of board share 0.109 −0.015 0.024 −0.052** −0.016** −0.030** 
(0.086) (0.067) (0.058) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.078 0.184** 0.110* −0.008** 0.054** 0.009** 
(0.059) (0.070) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.525** 0.759** 0.598** 0.081** −0.033** 0.022** 
(0.177) (0.243) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA −1.970* 0.883 −0.446 0.864** 2.606** 1.668** 
(0.988) (1.122) (0.684) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) 
Market to book ratio 0.013 0.041 0.007 0.018** −0.062** −0.029** 
(0.055) (0.038) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.103* 0.016 0.011 0.032** −0.018** 0.008** 
(0.051) (0.088) (0.042) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential slack −0.111** −0.006 −0.021 −0.002** −0.002** −0.003** 
(0.032) (0.009) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cumulative number of patents 0.000 −0.001** 0.000 −0.000** −0.001** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government experience 0.119 0.621* 0.006 0.275** 0.149** 0.146** 
(0.223) (0.267) (0.196) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Independent director 2.640** 0.265 1.337* 0.722** −0.394** 0.427** 
(0.907) (0.778) (0.633) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
CEO and chairman duality 0.156 −0.225+ 0.066 −0.105** −0.051** −0.080** 
(0.170) (0.132) (0.139) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
CEO salary −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province GDP per capita 0.000 −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province R&D expenditure −0.000** 0.000** 0.000 −0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province market development 0.008 0.151 0.141 −0.016** 0.028** 0.013** 
(0.087) (0.134) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,525 1,822 3,676 3,263 3,359 6,622 
Log pseudolikelihood −2794 −3346 −7465 −422 −580 −1115 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and include constant. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Industrial categories of products listed in the government procurement catalogs 
 
Industrial category Percentage 
Agriculture 2.41 
Animal Husbandry 0.37 
Fishery 0.90 
Education, Cultural, Sporting and Athletic Goods Manufacturing 0.02 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 16.20 
Chemical Fiber Manufacturing 3.40 
Electronic Components and Appliance 5.99 
Consumer Electronics Manufacturing 1.49 
Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing 0.73 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 7.25 
Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 7.07 
Special Equipment Manufacturing 11.68 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 13.29 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 5.42 
Instrumentation and Manufacturing of Machinery for Education and 
Cultural Uses 
0.90 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 9.66 
Biological Products Manufacturing 2.00 
Telecommunications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 4.89 
Computer and Related Equipment Manufacturing 1.79 
Telecommunication Services 0.80 
Computer Application and Services 3.74 
Note: The second column reports the proportions of patents that belong to each category generated by all 
Chinese firms between 2000 and 2012. 
 
